
Beyond the Double Veto: Land Use Plans as Preemptive Intergovernmental Compacts

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Motivation



Source: LAO Report, Mar. 17, 2015

Motivation

Transportation-sector emissions are main roadblock to achieving the state's GHG-emissions targets.

2018 PROGRESS REPORT

California's Sustainable Communities and Climate Protection Act



NOVEMBER 2018



What California Has Tried / Is Trying to Do About It

RHNA / PLANNING FRAMEWORK (VARIATION ON "WEST COAST MODEL")

- The state (HCD) makes "regional housing need assessments" (RHNA) every 4-8 years, which regional "Councils of Government" then allocate
- Local governments must revise "housing element" of general plan to accommodate their share of the RHNA, which HCD reviews / approves
- Housing element must identify "constraints" to meeting RHNA share, and articulate a "schedule of actions to remove constraints"
- Housing element, as component of the general plan, supersedes contrary local ordinances

DENSITY MANDATES

- ADU legislation
- State "density bonus" law
- Coming (?): SB 827 / SB50 (preemption of parking minimums and upzoning of property near transit and job centers for 4-5 story buildings)

What Has the Planning Framework Achieved?

APPARENTLY, NOT MUCH

- Lewis (2005) found that jurisdictions with an approved housing element produced no more housing than jurisdictions without one (controlling for other observable characteristics of the jurisdictions)
- Ramsey-Musolf (2016) found that jurisdictions with an approved housing element produced more subsidized housing--but less marketrate housing—than jurisdictions without one

These studies should be taken with several grains of salt (they rest on very strong assumptions), but California's housing-supply problem has clearly gotten worse, not better, since 1980.

Weaknesses of the Framework

TWO FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEMS

1) Population-forecast definition of housing need

- State determines housing quotas by forecasting population growth and rates of household formation
- But population growth is endogenous to land use policy
- In effect, exclusionary regions can "choose their own quotas"

The same problem is found in planning frameworks of other West Coast states.

Weaknesses of the Framework

TWO FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEMS

2) Misplaced presumption of local-government good faith

- Legal standard for housing element validity
- Legal standard for whether local ordinances are "consistent" with the housing element / general plan
- Remedies for legally inadequate housing element or inconsistent ordinance
- No reward / penalty for housing *outcomes*

How California Is Trying to Improve the Framework

1. CHOOSING A BETTER TARGET (RHNA / "NEEDED HOUSING")

- SB 828 (2018) begins to articulate a <u>healthy housing market</u> standard, with emphasis on share of "cost-burdened households" in target region relative to "comparable regions of the nation"
- SB 375 (2008) added jobs-housing imbalance as a factor which HCD may consider (but with no direction about *how* to use it, it's so far gone unused)
- Gov. Newsom just announced a big revamp of the RHNA process

How California Is Trying to Improve the Framework

2. HOUSING ELEMENT AS A PREEMPTIVE COMPACT FOR DEVELOPMENT PERMITTING (NOT JUST AN ASPIRATIONAL PLAN)

- 2017 reforms require housing element to assign RHNA quotas to specific, imminently developable sites, and to specify density for each site
- Developers now can apply for permits on basis of housing element itself, notwithstanding contrary local zoning
- Legislature has drastically curtailed judicial deference to local governments with respect to project permitting

Local gov't may not deny a project or reduce its density if there is evidence in the record that would <u>allow</u> (not require) <u>a reasonable</u> <u>person to conclude</u> that the project complies with applicable objective standards

How California Is Trying to Improve the Framework

3. CONSEQUENCES FOR HOUSING OUTCOMES

- SB 35 (2017) requires expedited, <u>by-right permitting</u> of certain projects if local government failed to meet its RHNA target during previous cycle
- SB 330 (2019, pending) would create special rules for local governments where <u>market rents</u> are high (abolition of parking minimums, 12-month / 3-hearing limit on project review, downzoning ban, and more)
- Gov. Newsom recently announced his intention to tie transportation funding to achievement of RHNA targets

But California Still Has a Ways to Go

- Future of RHNA determinations is up in the air
- Legal standard for a "substantially compliant" housing element does not allow state agency to reject housing element b/c it's unlikely to work (Oregon law is better)
- Preemptive effect of housing element can and should be strengthened (local governments still get deference on whether local ordinances are consistent with housing element)

But California Still Has a Ways to Go

TOP DOWN, BOTTOM UP, OR BOTH?

Reformers should conceive of state-planning frameworks as a means of reallocating political power and policymaking discretion at the local level, to support bottom-up attacks on barriers to dense housing.

Voters → City Council (elective preemption of voter-enacted "constraints")

City Council → Mayor (interim housing elements)