
Beyond the Double Veto: Land Use Plans as Preemptive Intergovernmental Compacts

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## **Motivation**



Source: LAO Report, Mar. 17, 2015

## **Motivation**

Transportation-sector emissions are main roadblock to achieving the state's GHG-emissions targets.

#### 2018 PROGRESS REPORT

California's Sustainable Communities and Climate Protection Act



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# What California Has Tried / Is Trying to Do About It

# RHNA / PLANNING FRAMEWORK (VARIATION ON "WEST COAST MODEL")

- The state (HCD) makes "regional housing need assessments" (RHNA) every 4-8 years, which regional "Councils of Government" then allocate
- Local governments must revise "housing element" of general plan to accommodate their share of the RHNA, which HCD reviews / approves
- Housing element must identify "constraints" to meeting RHNA share, and articulate a "schedule of actions to remove constraints"
- Housing element, as component of the general plan, supersedes contrary local ordinances

#### **DENSITY MANDATES**

- ADU legislation
- State "density bonus" law
- Coming (?): SB 827 / SB50 (preemption of parking minimums and upzoning of property near transit and job centers for 4-5 story buildings)

## What Has the Planning Framework Achieved?

#### **APPARENTLY, NOT MUCH**

- Lewis (2005) found that jurisdictions with an approved housing element produced no more housing than jurisdictions without one (controlling for other observable characteristics of the jurisdictions)
- Ramsey-Musolf (2016) found that jurisdictions with an approved housing element produced more subsidized housing--but less marketrate housing—than jurisdictions without one

These studies should be taken with several grains of salt (they rest on very strong assumptions), but California's housing-supply problem has clearly gotten worse, not better, since 1980.

## Weaknesses of the Framework

#### TWO FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEMS

### 1) Population-forecast definition of housing need

- State determines housing quotas by forecasting population growth and rates of household formation
- But population growth is endogenous to land use policy
- In effect, exclusionary regions can "choose their own quotas"

The same problem is found in planning frameworks of other West Coast states.

## Weaknesses of the Framework

#### TWO FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEMS

#### 2) Misplaced presumption of local-government good faith

- Legal standard for housing element validity
- Legal standard for whether local ordinances are "consistent" with the housing element / general plan
- Remedies for legally inadequate housing element or inconsistent ordinance
- No reward / penalty for housing *outcomes*

# How California Is Trying to Improve the Framework

#### 1. CHOOSING A BETTER TARGET (RHNA / "NEEDED HOUSING")

- SB 828 (2018) begins to articulate a <u>healthy housing market</u> standard, with emphasis on share of "cost-burdened households" in target region relative to "comparable regions of the nation"
- SB 375 (2008) added jobs-housing imbalance as a factor which HCD may consider (but with no direction about *how* to use it, it's so far gone unused)
- Gov. Newsom just announced a big revamp of the RHNA process

# How California Is Trying to Improve the Framework

#### 2. HOUSING ELEMENT AS A PREEMPTIVE COMPACT FOR DEVELOPMENT PERMITTING (NOT JUST AN ASPIRATIONAL PLAN)

- 2017 reforms require housing element to assign RHNA quotas to specific, imminently developable sites, and to specify density for each site
- Developers now can apply for permits on basis of housing element itself, notwithstanding contrary local zoning
- Legislature has drastically curtailed judicial deference to local governments with respect to project permitting

Local gov't may not deny a project or reduce its density if there is evidence in the record that would <u>allow</u> (not require) <u>a reasonable</u> <u>person to conclude</u> that the project complies with applicable objective standards

# How California Is Trying to Improve the Framework

#### **3. CONSEQUENCES FOR HOUSING OUTCOMES**

- SB 35 (2017) requires expedited, <u>by-right permitting</u> of certain projects if local government failed to meet its RHNA target during previous cycle
- SB 330 (2019, pending) would create special rules for local governments where <u>market rents</u> are high (abolition of parking minimums, 12-month / 3-hearing limit on project review, downzoning ban, and more)
- Gov. Newsom recently announced his intention to tie transportation funding to achievement of RHNA targets

## But California Still Has a Ways to Go

- Future of RHNA determinations is up in the air
- Legal standard for a "substantially compliant" housing element does not allow state agency to reject housing element b/c it's unlikely to work (Oregon law is better)
- Preemptive effect of housing element can and should be strengthened (local governments still get deference on whether local ordinances are consistent with housing element)

## But California Still Has a Ways to Go

#### TOP DOWN, BOTTOM UP, OR BOTH?

Reformers should conceive of state-planning frameworks as a means of reallocating political power and policymaking discretion at the local level, to support bottom-up attacks on barriers to dense housing.

Voters → City Council (elective preemption of voter-enacted "constraints")

City Council → Mayor (interim housing elements)